Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 2 Antitrust Marathon VI: Compliance
Matters

Article 14

2018

Supreme Court Term Spotlight: Ohio v. American Express
Company
Thomas J K Schick

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas J. Schick Supreme Court Term Spotlight: Ohio v. American Express Company, 30 Loy. Consumer
L. Rev. 296 (2018).
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol30/iss2/14

This Consumer News is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more information,
please contact law-library@luc.edu.

17.Schick (News).docx (Do Not Delete)

5/4/18 7:35 PM

SUPREME COURT TERM SPOTLIGHT: OHIO V. AMERICAN

EXPRESS COMPANY
Thomas J.K. Schick, News Editor
n addition to the prominent cases addressing First Amendment,1
searches and seizures,2 and immigration3 issues presented in the
2017–18 term docket, the Supreme Court will also hear two important consumer law disputes with potentially major commercial
implications.4 Not to be lost in the widespread media attention at-

I

1

See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct.

464 (2017) (granting certiorari to address whether disclosures required by a California reproductive rights law violate free speech
protections); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (granting certiorari to address
whether Colorado’s public accommodations law which compels a
baker to design and make a cake that violates his religious beliefs
about same-sex marriage violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment.).
2
See, e.g., Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 53 (2017) (granting certiorari to
address whether the Fourth Amendment automobile exception permits a police officer to enter private property to search a vehicle
parked a few feet from a residence without a warrant); Carpenter v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (granting certiorari to address
whether the warrantless search and seizure of cell phone location
and movement data violates the Fourth Amendment.).
3
See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 34 (2018) (granting certiorari to
address, inter alia, the constitutionality of President Donald
Trump’s 2017 proclamation restricting travel to the United States by
citizens from eight countries.).
4
See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017) (granting certiorari to address whether American Express’s anti-steering provisions
unreasonably restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act); Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (granting certiorari to
address whether the National Labor Relations Act prohibits enforcement of an agreement requiring employees to resolve disputes with
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tracted by other pending Supreme Court cases, the Court’s decision in Ohio v. American Express Company5 is poised to have great
effects on the cardholder, merchant, and lender sides the consumer
credit card industry. In American Express Company, the Court
will review a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit holding that the anti-steering provisions contained in merchant agreements with American Express—the second highest volume credit card network—do not unreasonably restrain trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.6
To grasp the context of the legal dispute before the Court in
American Express Company, it is important to understand the
basic mechanics of the credit card industry, specifically, anti-steering provisions. American Express and other credit card networks
charge merchants a fee each time a consumer uses their card to
make a transaction.7 Merchant fees vary by merchant and credit
card network.8 To control how merchants treat American Express
cardholders, American Express adopted anti-steering or “non-discriminatory provisions” in their contracts with merchants.9 Antisteering provisions seek to prevent merchants from directing consumers toward less expensive payment methods, namely, payment
methods that charge the merchant a lower fee to process the transaction.10 American Express’s anti-steering provision prevents merchants from, inter alia, indicating that it prefers other payment

the employer through individual arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.).
5
138 S. Ct. 355 (2017).
6
United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 188, 207 (2d Cir. 2016),
cert. granted sub nom., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355
(2017). Specifically, § 1 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part
that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (emphasis added).
7
See id. at 188–89.
8

See id.
See id. at 190–91.
10
See id. at 191–92; see also Steven Semerano, Settlement Without Consent: Assessing the Credit Card Merchant Fee Class Action, 2015
9

COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 186, 204 (2015).
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methods over American Express, dissuading cardholders from using American Express, and persuading American Express cardholders to use another form of payment.11 Use of anti-steering provisions seeks to benefit both American Express and consumers
because “[c]ertainty that [American Express] cards will be accepted
makes the network more attractive to cardholders—and, in turn,
cardholders’ use of the [American Express] network makes its
cards more attractive for merchants to accept.”12
In 2010, the United States and seventeen states sued American Express, Visa, and MasterCard in a New York District Court
for their use of anti-steering provisions that the plaintiffs argued
unreasonably restrained trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act.13 In 2014, American Express proceeded to trial after Visa and
MasterCard entered into consent judgments and voluntarily withdrew their anti-steering provisions.14 Following a seven week
bench trial before District Judge Nicholas Garaufis, the District
Court found that American Express violated antitrust laws.15 Notably, the District Court also found that American Express’s antisteering provisions “resulted in increased prices for consumers . . .
[because] [m]erchants facing increased credit card acceptance costs
will pass most, if not all, of their additional costs along to their customers in the form of higher retail prices.”16 The District Court permanently enjoined American Express from enforcing its anti-steering provision for ten years.17
On September 26, 2016, the Second Circuit reversed the injunction against American Express and held that the anti-steering
provisions did not violate § 1 of the Sherman Act.18 In applying the
“rule of reason” burden-shifting test, the Second Circuit held that
the relevant market included both the market for general purpose
11

See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 191.
Id. at 192.
13
See id.
14
See id.
15
See id.
12

16

United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 216 (E.D.N.Y.
2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom.,
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017).
17
See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 193.
18
See id. at 183.
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credit and charge card network services, as well as the market for
cardholders.19 The Second Circuit noted that the District Court
erred in not sufficiently embracing the “two-sided market” features
of the credit card industry in its market definition, and held that
“[t]his was error because the price charged to merchants necessarily affects cardholder demand, which in turn has a feedback effect on merchant demand (and thus influences the price charged to
merchants).”20 Additionally, the Second Circuit held that eliminating American Express’s anti-steering provisions would likely increase the market shares of Visa and MasterCard.21 Lastly, the Second Circuit held that “[t]he District Court’s erroneous market
definition caused its anticompetitive effects finding to come up
short, for it failed to consider the two-sided net price accounting
for the effects of the [anti-steering provisions] on both merchants
and cardholders.”22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 16, 2017.23
The Court’s anticipated American Express Company decision will have significant financial implications to consumers and
merchants. Petitioners and merchants hope that a victory at the
Supreme Court will allow them to chip away at the $50 billion
amount of fees paid to credit card companies annually.24 Consumers will be similarly affected as concerns about the impact of anti19

See id. at 194, 196–97. Stated another way, the Second Court concluded

by holding that “[t]he District Court erred here in focusing entirely
on the interests of merchants while discounting the interests of cardholders.” Id. at 206.
20
Id. at 200. The Second Circuit noted that the credit card industry is a
“two-sided market” because “cardholders benefit from holding a
card only if that card is accepted by a wide range of merchants, and
merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number
of cardholders use it.” Id. at 185–86.
21
See id. at 204. As of 2013, the Second Circuit stated that the credit card
transaction volume was shared as follows: Visa (45%), American Express (26.4%), MasterCard (23.3%), and Discover (5.3%). See id. at
188.
22
Id. at 204.
23
See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017).
24
See Greg Stohr, American Express Fee Accusations Get U.S. High Court
Hearing, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-16/american-express-fee-accusations-get-u-s-supreme-court-hearing.
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steering provisions on raising prices remain.25 The ubiquity of
credit cards as a primary payment method in the consumer economy raises the stakes further, especially considering that approximately twenty-two billion credit card transactions are made each
year totaling more than $2 trillion.26 On the other hand, American
Express will continue to rely on the Second Circuit’s holding that
the relevant market includes both merchants and cardholders, and
that Petitioners’ reliance on evidence of price increases caused by
anti-steering provisions “does not show competitive harm,” but rather “is perfectly consistent with vibrant competition.”27 Notably,
while a party to the case before the Second Circuit, the United
States did not join the appeal to the Supreme Court; however, the
United States did file a brief in support of the Petitioners.28
At the end of the day, the largest concern for consumers regarding the American Express Company case is presumably the
potential impact lawful anti-steering provisions may have on
prices of goods and services.29 This case illustrates the intersection
25

See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 216 (holding that American Ex-

press’s anti-steering provisions “resulted in increased prices for consumers”); see also Brief for The American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., No.
16-1454 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2017) (“Accepting the logic of the court of appeals would raise the burden on plaintiffs to show unlawful monopolization by a dominant platform even when the firm engages in exclusion for the sole purpose of raising prices or deterring
innovation.”); Brief for The Merchant Advisory Group as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., No. 161454 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2017) (“If Amex is successful in exempting its anticompetitive practices from antitrust liability, it will be the merchants, their employees, and American consumers who literally pay
the price.”); Brief for the United States Supporting Petitioners at 31,
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., No. 16-1454 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2017) (“Retail
consumers bear the ultimate economic burden of the anti-steering
rules.”).
26
See Stohr, supra note 24.
27
Brief for Respondents at 3, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., No. 16-1454 (U.S.
Jan. 16, 2018).
28
See Stohr, supra note 24 (noting that the “Trump administration said
that, while the appeals court ruling was wrong, the case didn’t meet
the Supreme Court’s usual standards for review.”); see also Brief for
the United States, supra note 25.
29
See Brief for The Merchant Advisory Group, supra note 25; Brief for the
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of law and economics and their respective evaluations of what is
just and equitable in the American credit card market. Focusing
on the Court’s canon of antitrust analysis, the Court’s decision will
likely clarify the proper market definition for the credit card industry and other two-sided markets.30 Because this case will likely determine whether credit card companies can use anti-steering provisions in their merchant agreements, particular attention should
be paid to measuring the actual effect of the Court's decision on
competition and prices.

30

United States, supra note 25.
See supra note 20; see also United States Telecom Ass’n v. Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n, 825 F.3d 674, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Williams,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the market
for broadband internet access may be two-sided, and that “[t]he answer to the question may well shed light on the reasonableness of the
[Federal Communications Commission] regulations” at issue in that
case), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 28, 2017.

